The Illusion of Free Will
Introduction
The aim of this article is to undermine the layman’s conception of free will. Sometimes called ‘libertarian’ free will, most people have a sense that they could do other than they in fact do: As a willing agent interacting with the world, if one has chosen A, then one could have chosen B. Specifically, I argue that the concept of libertarian free will rests upon confused metaphysics; and, thereby, that it’s incoherent to (even) entertain a possible universe in which free will exists. Further, I argue that recognising this fact is not strictly belied by human experience.
The Dilemma of Determinism
Determinism
If something is determined, then its occurrence must be contingent on one or many causal factors. To the extent that determinism is true of human beings—in their thoughts, intentions and actions—libertarian free will does not hold. Each moment of one's experience would be determined by prior causes, of which one is not responsible. For a will to be free, in the layman’s sense, it must first be able to establish itself over and above causal influence. Libertarian free will is therefore incompatible with determinism.
Indeterminism
If something is not determined, then its occurrence must not be contingent on one or many causal factors. To the extent that indeterminism is true of human beings—in their thoughts, intentions and actions—libertarian free will does not hold. Each moment of one's experience would be (by definition) uncaused, and therefore indistinguishable from randomness. For a will to be free, in the layman’s sense, it must second be able to establish itself in a non-arbitrary manner. (Typically, a free agent wants their decisions to be actually made sense out of.) Libertarian free will is therefore incompatible with indeterminism.
Constructing the dilemma
P1: If determinism is true, libertarian free will cannot exist.
P2: If determinism is not true, libertarian free will cannot exist.
P3: Determinism is either true or not true.
C: Therefore, libertarian free will cannot exist.
Note: Since the dilemma is a metaphysical one, it applies no matter one's material or immaterial commitments. Even if the world is made (fundamentally) of soul-stuff, free will remains a conceptual blunder.
Failing omniscience, it would be consistent to hold that free will is explicable only outside human conceptual schemes; but, this form of response can justify anything, unless there exists an independent basis for belief (see below).
Knowledge by Acquaintance
Often, it is claimed that there exists an independent (non-reasoned) basis for belief in free will. Namely: direct acquaintance; that is, through direct and immediate experience, one sees that they really do act, think or feel freely. This presents two key problems:
Conclusion
Needless to say, the free will debate is of great consequence: perceived freedom of the will grounds popular belief in moral responsibility, for example, as well as the justifiability of certain emotions like guilt and pride; so, which side of the debate one falls on is liable to significantly impact the character of their life. Still, in valuing the truth of the matter, one has to admit that a libertarian conception of free will is crucially untenable.
Introduction
The aim of this article is to undermine the layman’s conception of free will. Sometimes called ‘libertarian’ free will, most people have a sense that they could do other than they in fact do: As a willing agent interacting with the world, if one has chosen A, then one could have chosen B. Specifically, I argue that the concept of libertarian free will rests upon confused metaphysics; and, thereby, that it’s incoherent to (even) entertain a possible universe in which free will exists. Further, I argue that recognising this fact is not strictly belied by human experience.
The Dilemma of Determinism
Determinism
If something is determined, then its occurrence must be contingent on one or many causal factors. To the extent that determinism is true of human beings—in their thoughts, intentions and actions—libertarian free will does not hold. Each moment of one's experience would be determined by prior causes, of which one is not responsible. For a will to be free, in the layman’s sense, it must first be able to establish itself over and above causal influence. Libertarian free will is therefore incompatible with determinism.
Indeterminism
If something is not determined, then its occurrence must not be contingent on one or many causal factors. To the extent that indeterminism is true of human beings—in their thoughts, intentions and actions—libertarian free will does not hold. Each moment of one's experience would be (by definition) uncaused, and therefore indistinguishable from randomness. For a will to be free, in the layman’s sense, it must second be able to establish itself in a non-arbitrary manner. (Typically, a free agent wants their decisions to be actually made sense out of.) Libertarian free will is therefore incompatible with indeterminism.
Constructing the dilemma
P1: If determinism is true, libertarian free will cannot exist.
P2: If determinism is not true, libertarian free will cannot exist.
P3: Determinism is either true or not true.
C: Therefore, libertarian free will cannot exist.
Note: Since the dilemma is a metaphysical one, it applies no matter one's material or immaterial commitments. Even if the world is made (fundamentally) of soul-stuff, free will remains a conceptual blunder.
Failing omniscience, it would be consistent to hold that free will is explicable only outside human conceptual schemes; but, this form of response can justify anything, unless there exists an independent basis for belief (see below).
Knowledge by Acquaintance
Often, it is claimed that there exists an independent (non-reasoned) basis for belief in free will. Namely: direct acquaintance; that is, through direct and immediate experience, one sees that they really do act, think or feel freely. This presents two key problems:
- First, this is simply why the article is titled "The Illusion of Free Will”. Of course, for most people, there is a definite feeling of 'willing' freely, but the important question is whether this feeling reflects a deeper reality.
- Second, the feeling of free will is not universal. Long-term meditation practitioners (including myself) introspect that the contents of one's subjectivity tend not to be dictated by a centre, an agent, infact only seeming to arise and pass away.
Conclusion
Needless to say, the free will debate is of great consequence: perceived freedom of the will grounds popular belief in moral responsibility, for example, as well as the justifiability of certain emotions like guilt and pride; so, which side of the debate one falls on is liable to significantly impact the character of their life. Still, in valuing the truth of the matter, one has to admit that a libertarian conception of free will is crucially untenable.