The Irreducible Mind: On Consciousness
Introduction
Consciousness is a primitive, and so, in a sense, the contents of this analysis should be more familiar to the reader than anything else. Consciousness is a simple fact of “likeness”, that it is like something to be oneself, to be an experiencing thing.
Or, to help understand what we mean by consciousness, observe that consciousness is not the sort of thing which can be subject to doubt; to this, it is ontologically prior. For example, imagine one was to claim that consciousness is illusory: That is, while things seem one way (consciousness exists), they are actually another (consciousness does not exist). Then, the obvious flaw in this reasoning is to have (already) assumed the existence of consciousness, because if things seem like anything at all, then we must be conscious. Consciousness is at once that which is knowing, and that which is known.
So, readers may notice that I have isolated consciousness as something uniquely phenomenological (experience as such), and ignored psychological connotations (e.g., wakefulness or deliberate cognition). This is important for clarifying (and separating) the so-called “hard” & “easy” problems of consciousness, the former being of immediate relevance to this analysis. In short, the hard problem of consciousness involves explaining why we experience, whereas the easy problem(s) of consciousness involve explaining what we experience. And, with a rough-and-ready description of what consciousness is, the aim of this analysis is to present an argument as to why the hard problem is not a physical problem—i.e., consciousness is not and (in-principle) cannot be explained by physical facts.
In-so-doing, I advance a form of dualism (property dualism), which recognises two, distinct worldly properties: mental properties & physical properties. (Philosopher David Chalmers, from whom I have adapted the following arguments, provides a comprehensive elaboration of this view in his book “A Conscious Mind”, for those interested in further reading.)
The Central Argument
In support of (1)
Our first premise should court little controversy. However, the (likely) unfamiliar terminology deserves clarification, as follows.
Supervenience is a relation borne between some arbitrary A-facts and B-facts such that if the B-facts supervene on the A-facts, the B-facts cannot vary unless the A-facts vary. A-facts and B-facts are separated by levels-of-description, with the A-facts being ‘lower-level’ facts, and the B-facts ‘higher-level’. As an illustration, in mechanics, we know that the accelerant motion of a body (B-fact) is supervenient on its being acted upon by a nonzero resultant force (A-fact).
Logical supervenience, then, is simply supervenience which obtains as a matter of logic. Take a quadrilateral: Being a quadrilateral supervenes logically on having 4 sides, and, to say otherwise would be to strictly contradict how a quadrilateral is defined; in other words, to say that B-facts (e.g., being a quadrilateral) supervene logically on A-facts (e.g., having four sides), is just to say that the B-facts are entailed by the A-facts.
For the purposes of reductive explanation, logical supervenience is a necessary condition. If it’s logically possible that a set of A-facts do not entail another set of B-facts, then the B-facts must be something in addition to the A-facts, further facts which the A-facts cannot explain. So, a hypothetical God, having fixed all the A-facts, would still have more work to do in order to fix the B-facts. Or, put simply, it is very much the goal of reductive explanation to neutralise the question: “Why must the A-facts be accompanied by the B-facts?”; and, this requires logical supervenience.
Note that, often, logical supervenience is contrasted with natural supervenience, which obtains by virtue of the way the world is. Absence of the former supervenience relation (with respect to some arbitrary A- and B-facts) does not imply absence of the latter: A-facts might happen to be accompanied by B-facts—via lawful, natural supervenience—without the B-facts being explained in terms of the A-facts.
In support of (2)
a) If there there exists a logically possible world, physically identical to ours, in which the facts about consciousness vary, then it follows (by definition) that consciousness does not logically supervene on physical facts. (p -> q)
b) There exists a logically possible world, physically identical to ours, in which the facts about consciousness vary. (p)
c) Therefore, it follows (by definition) that consciousness does not logically supervene on physical facts. (q)
Above is a (sub-)argument designed to vindicate premise (2), appearing in conclusion (c). Since premise (b) is the linchpin of this argument, we will justify it further below. Here, the notion of logical possibility is an intuitive one. We take it that, broadly, if one can form a coherent, non-contradictory concept of any world W, then W is logically possible.
Taking-for-granted that we are conscious, a world in which consciousness is absent is a world in which the facts about consciousness vary. And, in support of (b), there is reason to believe that this world is logically possible. Suppose: In this world, all matter and energy are distributed identically across space and time. So, everything looks the same, and behaves in the same way. As a human (or nonhuman) organism, one will react, speak and cognize identically to one’s conscious counterpart—perhaps even claim oneself to be conscious—and yet (all-the-while), the lights are off. To entertain this world is to simultaneously enter the realm of “philosophical-zombification”, for there is nothing that it is like to be (in) this world.
Thence, to trust that the world of philosophical zombies is a logical impossibility seems patently false. Logical possibility a very thin-requirement, and since we do not seem to encounter any contradictions, or incoherencies, in imagining the zombie world, the requirement would be met. Of course, we are not commenting on the way things are or will tend to be. By analogy, we might not think it naturally possible or probable that pigs could or would fly, but it is still logically possible for things to be just so. Thereby, we have it that the world of philosophical zombies is logically possible. So, there is a logically possible world, physically identical to ours, in which the facts about consciousness vary.
This is the manner in which we support premise (b), and so reach conclusion (c), and so reach premise (2). Readers should feel free to differ on this point; it is a committed step in our overall argument.
Zombies aside, premise (2) encapsulates a basic idea. In the (approximate) words of David Chalmers: “Given any structural or functional account of the physical processes that underlie consciousness, there will always be a further question that eludes reductive explanation: ‘Why must these processes be accompanied by conscious experience?’”.
Conclusion
Granting the truth of premises (1) and (2), the conclusion follows necessarily via modus ponens. Namely, consciousness cannot be (reductively) explained in terms of physical facts. This is the ontological punchline.
And while, getting here, we have ensured only careful and precise steps in our reasoning, sceptics may (nonetheless) fancy that this analysis has performed some kind of subtle trick, so should not be taken seriously.
Surely, though, the sceptic can admit that consciousness is a datum which cries out for (some form of) explanation, and thereby bears an apparent lack-of-fit with a physical account. Of course, we have only followed and spelled-out the consequences of this intuition.
Know finally that if (indeed) consciousness cannot be physically explained—if we do admit mental properties to our ontology—then there is no fated path towards new-age superstition or religious dogmatism. Instead, there is reason to believe that consciousness should be taken as fundamental.
Introduction
Consciousness is a primitive, and so, in a sense, the contents of this analysis should be more familiar to the reader than anything else. Consciousness is a simple fact of “likeness”, that it is like something to be oneself, to be an experiencing thing.
Or, to help understand what we mean by consciousness, observe that consciousness is not the sort of thing which can be subject to doubt; to this, it is ontologically prior. For example, imagine one was to claim that consciousness is illusory: That is, while things seem one way (consciousness exists), they are actually another (consciousness does not exist). Then, the obvious flaw in this reasoning is to have (already) assumed the existence of consciousness, because if things seem like anything at all, then we must be conscious. Consciousness is at once that which is knowing, and that which is known.
So, readers may notice that I have isolated consciousness as something uniquely phenomenological (experience as such), and ignored psychological connotations (e.g., wakefulness or deliberate cognition). This is important for clarifying (and separating) the so-called “hard” & “easy” problems of consciousness, the former being of immediate relevance to this analysis. In short, the hard problem of consciousness involves explaining why we experience, whereas the easy problem(s) of consciousness involve explaining what we experience. And, with a rough-and-ready description of what consciousness is, the aim of this analysis is to present an argument as to why the hard problem is not a physical problem—i.e., consciousness is not and (in-principle) cannot be explained by physical facts.
In-so-doing, I advance a form of dualism (property dualism), which recognises two, distinct worldly properties: mental properties & physical properties. (Philosopher David Chalmers, from whom I have adapted the following arguments, provides a comprehensive elaboration of this view in his book “A Conscious Mind”, for those interested in further reading.)
The Central Argument
- If something does not logically supervene on physical facts, it cannot be (reductively) explained in terms of physical facts. (p -> q)
- Consciousness does not logically supervene on physical facts. (p)
- Therefore, consciousness cannot be (reductively) explained in terms of physical facts. (q)
In support of (1)
Our first premise should court little controversy. However, the (likely) unfamiliar terminology deserves clarification, as follows.
Supervenience is a relation borne between some arbitrary A-facts and B-facts such that if the B-facts supervene on the A-facts, the B-facts cannot vary unless the A-facts vary. A-facts and B-facts are separated by levels-of-description, with the A-facts being ‘lower-level’ facts, and the B-facts ‘higher-level’. As an illustration, in mechanics, we know that the accelerant motion of a body (B-fact) is supervenient on its being acted upon by a nonzero resultant force (A-fact).
Logical supervenience, then, is simply supervenience which obtains as a matter of logic. Take a quadrilateral: Being a quadrilateral supervenes logically on having 4 sides, and, to say otherwise would be to strictly contradict how a quadrilateral is defined; in other words, to say that B-facts (e.g., being a quadrilateral) supervene logically on A-facts (e.g., having four sides), is just to say that the B-facts are entailed by the A-facts.
For the purposes of reductive explanation, logical supervenience is a necessary condition. If it’s logically possible that a set of A-facts do not entail another set of B-facts, then the B-facts must be something in addition to the A-facts, further facts which the A-facts cannot explain. So, a hypothetical God, having fixed all the A-facts, would still have more work to do in order to fix the B-facts. Or, put simply, it is very much the goal of reductive explanation to neutralise the question: “Why must the A-facts be accompanied by the B-facts?”; and, this requires logical supervenience.
Note that, often, logical supervenience is contrasted with natural supervenience, which obtains by virtue of the way the world is. Absence of the former supervenience relation (with respect to some arbitrary A- and B-facts) does not imply absence of the latter: A-facts might happen to be accompanied by B-facts—via lawful, natural supervenience—without the B-facts being explained in terms of the A-facts.
In support of (2)
a) If there there exists a logically possible world, physically identical to ours, in which the facts about consciousness vary, then it follows (by definition) that consciousness does not logically supervene on physical facts. (p -> q)
b) There exists a logically possible world, physically identical to ours, in which the facts about consciousness vary. (p)
c) Therefore, it follows (by definition) that consciousness does not logically supervene on physical facts. (q)
Above is a (sub-)argument designed to vindicate premise (2), appearing in conclusion (c). Since premise (b) is the linchpin of this argument, we will justify it further below. Here, the notion of logical possibility is an intuitive one. We take it that, broadly, if one can form a coherent, non-contradictory concept of any world W, then W is logically possible.
Taking-for-granted that we are conscious, a world in which consciousness is absent is a world in which the facts about consciousness vary. And, in support of (b), there is reason to believe that this world is logically possible. Suppose: In this world, all matter and energy are distributed identically across space and time. So, everything looks the same, and behaves in the same way. As a human (or nonhuman) organism, one will react, speak and cognize identically to one’s conscious counterpart—perhaps even claim oneself to be conscious—and yet (all-the-while), the lights are off. To entertain this world is to simultaneously enter the realm of “philosophical-zombification”, for there is nothing that it is like to be (in) this world.
Thence, to trust that the world of philosophical zombies is a logical impossibility seems patently false. Logical possibility a very thin-requirement, and since we do not seem to encounter any contradictions, or incoherencies, in imagining the zombie world, the requirement would be met. Of course, we are not commenting on the way things are or will tend to be. By analogy, we might not think it naturally possible or probable that pigs could or would fly, but it is still logically possible for things to be just so. Thereby, we have it that the world of philosophical zombies is logically possible. So, there is a logically possible world, physically identical to ours, in which the facts about consciousness vary.
This is the manner in which we support premise (b), and so reach conclusion (c), and so reach premise (2). Readers should feel free to differ on this point; it is a committed step in our overall argument.
Zombies aside, premise (2) encapsulates a basic idea. In the (approximate) words of David Chalmers: “Given any structural or functional account of the physical processes that underlie consciousness, there will always be a further question that eludes reductive explanation: ‘Why must these processes be accompanied by conscious experience?’”.
Conclusion
Granting the truth of premises (1) and (2), the conclusion follows necessarily via modus ponens. Namely, consciousness cannot be (reductively) explained in terms of physical facts. This is the ontological punchline.
And while, getting here, we have ensured only careful and precise steps in our reasoning, sceptics may (nonetheless) fancy that this analysis has performed some kind of subtle trick, so should not be taken seriously.
Surely, though, the sceptic can admit that consciousness is a datum which cries out for (some form of) explanation, and thereby bears an apparent lack-of-fit with a physical account. Of course, we have only followed and spelled-out the consequences of this intuition.
Know finally that if (indeed) consciousness cannot be physically explained—if we do admit mental properties to our ontology—then there is no fated path towards new-age superstition or religious dogmatism. Instead, there is reason to believe that consciousness should be taken as fundamental.