Preface
Nonvegan (or vegan) moral positions with differential standards-of-treatment for human and nonhuman animals are candidates for consistency-testing. If a nonvegan (or vegan) moral position is inconsistent—if it reduces to a contradiction—then the position must be false; this obtains so-long-as one affirms that a proposition and its negation cannot simultaneously hold. That is to say, consistency-testing informs us which differential standards-of-treatment for human and nonhuman animals are compatible on a given moral view. In practice, consistency-testing often results in nonvegan (or vegan) agents observing unintended logical consequences of their position, so leading to positional adjustment.
In this analysis, on the question “Should cows have the right not to be stabbed for a hamburger?”, I present an abstracted nonvegan consistency test, represented in the form of dialogue flow. Then, at key points in the dialogue, I examine the different logical pathways that emerge. For the sake of completeness, this analysis is spread across multiple articles, coded (in the dialogue) with an asterisk and corresponding article number. Thereby, this current article (pt.1) is a frame-of-reference within which to interpret subsequent articles; it also includes some immediate points of clarification.
My contention is that (given logical consequences), consistent nonvegan moral positions on the question “Should cows have the right not to be stabbed for a hamburger?”, are incompatible with the stated-values of most individuals. To capture this idea, defining some average member of the public “John”, John will model a generic, broadly representative actor in our analysis.
Dialogue
Q1: Do you agree that there are humans who are of moral value?
Nonvegan: Yes.
Q2: Do you think that this value is sufficient for the right not to be stabbed for a hamburger?
Nonvegan: Yes.
Q3: Do you believe that cows lack sufficient moral value for the right not to be stabbed for a hamburger?
Nonvegan: Yes.
Q4: So, there must be something (or some set of things) true of a cow, that if true of a human, would cause the human to lose sufficient moral value for the right not to be stabbed for a hamburger, correct?
Nonvegan: Yes.
Q5: So, what are those things true of the cow?
Nonvegan: {a, b, c…}1.
Q6: Have you considered that {a, b, c…}n has logical consequences {x, y, z…}n? Do you accept these consequences?
Terminal Pathway [ Nonvegan: Yes.*3 OR Progressive pathway [ Nonvegan: No.*2
Q7: So, if you do not accept {x, y, z…}n, then it follows that you cannot accept {a, b, c…}n. Is there anything else relevantly true of the cow?
Recycle Q6 [ Nonvegan: Yes, {a,b, c…}n+1.*2
Commentary
Observe that the dialogue terminates in a single pathway; however, this can follow from multiple loops through the progressive pathway, so recycling Q6. Such a format is fixed by answers to Q1, Q2 and Q3 (our initial conditions). Below, given the initial conditions, we prove that Q4 and Q7 cannot be answered in the negative:
Moreover: While, in the dialogue, nonvegan standards-of-treatment are borne of (moral) value-assignments, this is immaterial to its underlying logic. For instance, Q1 and Q2 could be hypothetically reduced to “Do you think it is justified to stab a human for a hamburger?”, and so Q3 and Q4 adjusted accordingly. Value-assignment formatting is, nonetheless, helpful for purposes of generality. Value-assignments are likely to affect multiple standards-of-treatment (beyond that under examination) deemed acceptable by the nonvegan agent. Also, value-assignment formatting specifies an appropriate domain of relevance in answering Q5.
Nonvegan (or vegan) moral positions with differential standards-of-treatment for human and nonhuman animals are candidates for consistency-testing. If a nonvegan (or vegan) moral position is inconsistent—if it reduces to a contradiction—then the position must be false; this obtains so-long-as one affirms that a proposition and its negation cannot simultaneously hold. That is to say, consistency-testing informs us which differential standards-of-treatment for human and nonhuman animals are compatible on a given moral view. In practice, consistency-testing often results in nonvegan (or vegan) agents observing unintended logical consequences of their position, so leading to positional adjustment.
In this analysis, on the question “Should cows have the right not to be stabbed for a hamburger?”, I present an abstracted nonvegan consistency test, represented in the form of dialogue flow. Then, at key points in the dialogue, I examine the different logical pathways that emerge. For the sake of completeness, this analysis is spread across multiple articles, coded (in the dialogue) with an asterisk and corresponding article number. Thereby, this current article (pt.1) is a frame-of-reference within which to interpret subsequent articles; it also includes some immediate points of clarification.
My contention is that (given logical consequences), consistent nonvegan moral positions on the question “Should cows have the right not to be stabbed for a hamburger?”, are incompatible with the stated-values of most individuals. To capture this idea, defining some average member of the public “John”, John will model a generic, broadly representative actor in our analysis.
Dialogue
Q1: Do you agree that there are humans who are of moral value?
Nonvegan: Yes.
Q2: Do you think that this value is sufficient for the right not to be stabbed for a hamburger?
Nonvegan: Yes.
Q3: Do you believe that cows lack sufficient moral value for the right not to be stabbed for a hamburger?
Nonvegan: Yes.
Q4: So, there must be something (or some set of things) true of a cow, that if true of a human, would cause the human to lose sufficient moral value for the right not to be stabbed for a hamburger, correct?
Nonvegan: Yes.
Q5: So, what are those things true of the cow?
Nonvegan: {a, b, c…}1.
Q6: Have you considered that {a, b, c…}n has logical consequences {x, y, z…}n? Do you accept these consequences?
Terminal Pathway [ Nonvegan: Yes.*3 OR Progressive pathway [ Nonvegan: No.*2
Q7: So, if you do not accept {x, y, z…}n, then it follows that you cannot accept {a, b, c…}n. Is there anything else relevantly true of the cow?
Recycle Q6 [ Nonvegan: Yes, {a,b, c…}n+1.*2
Commentary
Observe that the dialogue terminates in a single pathway; however, this can follow from multiple loops through the progressive pathway, so recycling Q6. Such a format is fixed by answers to Q1, Q2 and Q3 (our initial conditions). Below, given the initial conditions, we prove that Q4 and Q7 cannot be answered in the negative:
- A given human H is of sufficient moral value for the right not to be stabbed for a hamburger. (from Q2)
- A given cow C is not of sufficient moral value for the right not to be stabbed for a hamburger. (from Q3)
- Suppose (for contradiction): There is nothing true of cow C, that if true of human H, would cause human H to lose sufficient moral value for the right not to be stabbed for a hamburger.
- (So,) we can switch all things true of cow C, to be true of human H, while human H retains sufficient moral value for the right not to be stabbed for a hamburger. (from 3.)
- (So,) human H becomes cow C. (from 4.)
- (So,) cow C is of sufficient moral value for the right not to be stabbed for a hamburger. (from 4., 5.)
- (So,) cow C is and is not of sufficient moral value for the right not to be stabbed for a hamburger. (from 2., 6.)
- Proof: There must be something (or some set of things) true of cow C, that if true of human H, would cause human H to lose sufficient moral value for the right not to be stabbed for a hamburger.
Moreover: While, in the dialogue, nonvegan standards-of-treatment are borne of (moral) value-assignments, this is immaterial to its underlying logic. For instance, Q1 and Q2 could be hypothetically reduced to “Do you think it is justified to stab a human for a hamburger?”, and so Q3 and Q4 adjusted accordingly. Value-assignment formatting is, nonetheless, helpful for purposes of generality. Value-assignments are likely to affect multiple standards-of-treatment (beyond that under examination) deemed acceptable by the nonvegan agent. Also, value-assignment formatting specifies an appropriate domain of relevance in answering Q5.