This article (pt.2) examines a specific set of common nonvegan responses looped through Q6 and Q7 of the abstracted dialogue. In-the-eyes-of John, this set of responses does not “stack”: naming things true of the cow which are not relevantly true of the cow; that is, if equalised in the human context, the human’s moral value would not be impacted. (The set also includes responses which rest upon fallacy, or false information.) We can divide the set into six major classes, as follows.
Class 1: Nature
a. “It’s natural to (stab and) eat the cow.”
This is the general appeal to nature. Observe, however, that if it were natural to (stab and) eat humans for hamburgers, this is unlikely to influence John’s decision to do so. There are already many natural things which John does not consider good, and, in this way, John brings independent criteria to the table to determine whether something natural is good or not good. So, while bone cancer in children is perfectly natural, John does not look to whether it's natural to determine whether it's good.
b. “The cow is at a lower-order in the food chain.”
Hypothetical aliens who seek to conquer and holocaust humanity for hamburgers can do so at a higher-order in the food chain to humans. However, John does not consider this a reason to holocaust humanity for hamburgers. So, being at a lower order in the food chain cannot (per se) provide justification for stabbing cows for hamburgers.
c. “Humans are animals. Animals eat animals.”
This element in the nature class admits two interpretations, which we deal with separately.
i. “[…] And that’s that.”
Here, the nonvegan respondent commits the fallacy of misplaced concreteness. Since (exactly) the matter of contention is whether humans should not eat animals, this implies we can not eat animals. We are not subject to any binding law that destines things otherwise.
ii. “[…] And we should do what animals do.”
Animals eat animals. They also abundantly rape the opposite sex, eat poo, and kill their weaker siblings. Absent moral agency, (nonhuman) animals do not have the capacity to choose right from wrong. So, John’s taking moral and/or behavioural guidance from animals would just be to entirely repudiate his moral sense (and in turn justify rape). However, John does not desire this.
d. “Humans evolved eating meat.”
In a similar fashion to (c.ii.), consider that humans also evolved raping and pillaging neighbouring tribes. John does not think that this provides a reason to rape and pillage. So, John does not identify that which humans have evolved doing with justification for that which was done.
e. “It’s the circle-of-life.”
It is also the circle-of-life for males to kill other males when competing for female mates. Yet still, John does not think it (remotely) ethical to murder all the males he sees on tinder.
Class 2: Societal Conditions
a. “It’s tradition that we (stab and) eat the cow.”
It has been tradition to keep slaves, yet this does not influence John’s moral position with respect to their emancipation at the time. And, if it were traditional to (stab and) eat humans, John (still) would not support eating humans. Often, one finds that assuming tradition as a justification for stabbing cows is to have already assumed the moral status of stabbing cows.
b. “It’s legal that we (stab and) eat the cow.”
It has been legal to keep slaves, yet this does not influence John’s moral position with respect to their emancipation at the time. And, if it were legal to (stab and) eat humans, John (still) would not support eating humans. Often, one finds that assuming legality as a justification for stabbing cows is to have already assumed the moral status of stabbing cows.
Class 3: Consciousness
a. “The cow and other farm animals are not conscious.”
Of course, animal consciousness is not deductively proven; that is, we can never be certain that animals—or other humans than ourselves, for that matter—are conscious. However, there is a very strong inductive basis to suppose they are, because between humans (assumed-to-be conscious) and nonhuman animals, there is not the appropriate anatomical or physiological dis-analogy. Here is the Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness saying as much: “Convergent evidence indicates that non-human animals have the neuroanatomical, neurochemical, and neurophysiological substrates of conscious states along with the capacity to exhibit intentional behaviours”[i]. Therefore, John’s respect for the evidence prohibits his arguing for stabbing cows based on unconsciousness.
b. “Plants are conscious.”
Fortunately, there is not much reason (scientific or otherwise) to believe that plants are conscious. We know that a plant can respond to its environment intelligently, but that this intelligence summates to subjective experience is highly underdetermined. By analogy, smart missiles respond intelligently to their environment, but John does not suspect that smart missiles are conscious. Granting that plants could be conscious, then, without a central nervous system, plant consciousness would have to be very primitive. For instance, it would be outlandish to suppose that plant consciousness could take on affective states.
Class 4: Misperceived necessity
a. “Animal products (including the cow) are needed to maintain physical health.”
This claim is not borne out empirically. In fact, the largest bodies of nutritional professionals in the world have released peer-reviewed statements declaring the adequacy of well-planned vegan and vegetarian diets. For example, the Academy of Nutrition and Dietetics claim that well-planned vegan and vegetarian diets are adequate for all walks of life: for childhood, adulthood, athletes, pregnancy, etc.[ii].
b. “Animal products (including the cow) are needed to feed the (growing) human population.”
Here, the nonvegan respondent takes a similar disregard for the evidence. Crucially, GCSE biology tells us that energy is lost by adding more trophic levels to the food chain, and so filtering our nutrition through animals—rather than simply eating plants ourselves—requires significantly more resources for the same caloric output. (Not to mention the greater land-use and environmental destruction.)
Class 5: Species
a. “The cow is of a different species.”
At this point in the dialogue, the nonvegan respondent should define what they mean by ‘species’; they may intend something which amounts to (b.). On more literal interpretations, we can address two types of species concept:
i. Biological species concepts (BSCs)
Note that BSCs (e.g., successful interbreeding) do not relate to the experience of an organism in question, telling us nothing about the organism’s feelings, thoughts, and desires. It is a feature like race, hair colour, or an inward belly button. So, if we were to transfer human consciousnesses into nonhuman biological substrates, John would not claim that existing in these substrates is for them to have lost moral value.
ii. ‘Similar characteristics’ species concepts (SCSCs)
To use SCSCs to differentiate human and nonhuman animals is just to beg the question of which characteristics, similar among humans, are lacking or uniquely present in cows, such as to be relevantly true for stabbing them.
b. "Humans are the ‘in-group’ and animals the ‘out-group’.”
Consider that the racist has a very clear sense of his/her ‘in-group’ and ‘out-group’. However, John does not want to think like a racist, especially when it comes to something as serious as stabbing—hopefully, when it comes to anything.
Class 6: Derailment
a. “But if you were on a desert island…”
In the abstracted dialogue, nonvegan standards-of-treatment with respect to stabbing human and nonhuman animals for hamburgers should be interpreted in the context of how one typically stabs for hamburgers. Unless there is a clear logical-link between desert island scenarios and this context, there is no basis for entertaining desert island scenarios.
b. “Vegans are disagreeable people.”
This is considered derailment because one’s feelings toward vegans as people are orthogonal to the ethical principles associated with veganism (relevantly, not stabbing a cow). By analogy, lots of bad people do not cut off all their fingers, but John does not think that this provides reason to cut off all his fingers.
[i] Source: Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness, July 2012
http://fcmconference.org/img/CambridgeDeclarationOnConsciousness.pdf
[ii] (Previously named: The American Dietetic Association) Source: PubMed, “Position of the American Dietetic Association: vegetarian diets”, 2009
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/19562864
Class 1: Nature
a. “It’s natural to (stab and) eat the cow.”
This is the general appeal to nature. Observe, however, that if it were natural to (stab and) eat humans for hamburgers, this is unlikely to influence John’s decision to do so. There are already many natural things which John does not consider good, and, in this way, John brings independent criteria to the table to determine whether something natural is good or not good. So, while bone cancer in children is perfectly natural, John does not look to whether it's natural to determine whether it's good.
b. “The cow is at a lower-order in the food chain.”
Hypothetical aliens who seek to conquer and holocaust humanity for hamburgers can do so at a higher-order in the food chain to humans. However, John does not consider this a reason to holocaust humanity for hamburgers. So, being at a lower order in the food chain cannot (per se) provide justification for stabbing cows for hamburgers.
c. “Humans are animals. Animals eat animals.”
This element in the nature class admits two interpretations, which we deal with separately.
i. “[…] And that’s that.”
Here, the nonvegan respondent commits the fallacy of misplaced concreteness. Since (exactly) the matter of contention is whether humans should not eat animals, this implies we can not eat animals. We are not subject to any binding law that destines things otherwise.
ii. “[…] And we should do what animals do.”
Animals eat animals. They also abundantly rape the opposite sex, eat poo, and kill their weaker siblings. Absent moral agency, (nonhuman) animals do not have the capacity to choose right from wrong. So, John’s taking moral and/or behavioural guidance from animals would just be to entirely repudiate his moral sense (and in turn justify rape). However, John does not desire this.
d. “Humans evolved eating meat.”
In a similar fashion to (c.ii.), consider that humans also evolved raping and pillaging neighbouring tribes. John does not think that this provides a reason to rape and pillage. So, John does not identify that which humans have evolved doing with justification for that which was done.
e. “It’s the circle-of-life.”
It is also the circle-of-life for males to kill other males when competing for female mates. Yet still, John does not think it (remotely) ethical to murder all the males he sees on tinder.
Class 2: Societal Conditions
a. “It’s tradition that we (stab and) eat the cow.”
It has been tradition to keep slaves, yet this does not influence John’s moral position with respect to their emancipation at the time. And, if it were traditional to (stab and) eat humans, John (still) would not support eating humans. Often, one finds that assuming tradition as a justification for stabbing cows is to have already assumed the moral status of stabbing cows.
b. “It’s legal that we (stab and) eat the cow.”
It has been legal to keep slaves, yet this does not influence John’s moral position with respect to their emancipation at the time. And, if it were legal to (stab and) eat humans, John (still) would not support eating humans. Often, one finds that assuming legality as a justification for stabbing cows is to have already assumed the moral status of stabbing cows.
Class 3: Consciousness
a. “The cow and other farm animals are not conscious.”
Of course, animal consciousness is not deductively proven; that is, we can never be certain that animals—or other humans than ourselves, for that matter—are conscious. However, there is a very strong inductive basis to suppose they are, because between humans (assumed-to-be conscious) and nonhuman animals, there is not the appropriate anatomical or physiological dis-analogy. Here is the Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness saying as much: “Convergent evidence indicates that non-human animals have the neuroanatomical, neurochemical, and neurophysiological substrates of conscious states along with the capacity to exhibit intentional behaviours”[i]. Therefore, John’s respect for the evidence prohibits his arguing for stabbing cows based on unconsciousness.
b. “Plants are conscious.”
Fortunately, there is not much reason (scientific or otherwise) to believe that plants are conscious. We know that a plant can respond to its environment intelligently, but that this intelligence summates to subjective experience is highly underdetermined. By analogy, smart missiles respond intelligently to their environment, but John does not suspect that smart missiles are conscious. Granting that plants could be conscious, then, without a central nervous system, plant consciousness would have to be very primitive. For instance, it would be outlandish to suppose that plant consciousness could take on affective states.
Class 4: Misperceived necessity
a. “Animal products (including the cow) are needed to maintain physical health.”
This claim is not borne out empirically. In fact, the largest bodies of nutritional professionals in the world have released peer-reviewed statements declaring the adequacy of well-planned vegan and vegetarian diets. For example, the Academy of Nutrition and Dietetics claim that well-planned vegan and vegetarian diets are adequate for all walks of life: for childhood, adulthood, athletes, pregnancy, etc.[ii].
b. “Animal products (including the cow) are needed to feed the (growing) human population.”
Here, the nonvegan respondent takes a similar disregard for the evidence. Crucially, GCSE biology tells us that energy is lost by adding more trophic levels to the food chain, and so filtering our nutrition through animals—rather than simply eating plants ourselves—requires significantly more resources for the same caloric output. (Not to mention the greater land-use and environmental destruction.)
Class 5: Species
a. “The cow is of a different species.”
At this point in the dialogue, the nonvegan respondent should define what they mean by ‘species’; they may intend something which amounts to (b.). On more literal interpretations, we can address two types of species concept:
i. Biological species concepts (BSCs)
Note that BSCs (e.g., successful interbreeding) do not relate to the experience of an organism in question, telling us nothing about the organism’s feelings, thoughts, and desires. It is a feature like race, hair colour, or an inward belly button. So, if we were to transfer human consciousnesses into nonhuman biological substrates, John would not claim that existing in these substrates is for them to have lost moral value.
ii. ‘Similar characteristics’ species concepts (SCSCs)
To use SCSCs to differentiate human and nonhuman animals is just to beg the question of which characteristics, similar among humans, are lacking or uniquely present in cows, such as to be relevantly true for stabbing them.
b. "Humans are the ‘in-group’ and animals the ‘out-group’.”
Consider that the racist has a very clear sense of his/her ‘in-group’ and ‘out-group’. However, John does not want to think like a racist, especially when it comes to something as serious as stabbing—hopefully, when it comes to anything.
Class 6: Derailment
a. “But if you were on a desert island…”
In the abstracted dialogue, nonvegan standards-of-treatment with respect to stabbing human and nonhuman animals for hamburgers should be interpreted in the context of how one typically stabs for hamburgers. Unless there is a clear logical-link between desert island scenarios and this context, there is no basis for entertaining desert island scenarios.
b. “Vegans are disagreeable people.”
This is considered derailment because one’s feelings toward vegans as people are orthogonal to the ethical principles associated with veganism (relevantly, not stabbing a cow). By analogy, lots of bad people do not cut off all their fingers, but John does not think that this provides reason to cut off all his fingers.
[i] Source: Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness, July 2012
http://fcmconference.org/img/CambridgeDeclarationOnConsciousness.pdf
[ii] (Previously named: The American Dietetic Association) Source: PubMed, “Position of the American Dietetic Association: vegetarian diets”, 2009
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/19562864