In this article (pt.3), a nonvegan moral position on the question “Should cows have the right not to be stabbed for a hamburger?”, is attempted in a form—as in the abstracted dialogue—such that: At the terminal pathway, John presents a complete (stackable) set {a, b, c…}i where all truths in {a, b, c…}i are deemed value-assignment relevant, but where John does not claim that a human equalised in respect of {a, b, c…}i lacks sufficient moral-value for the right not to be stabbed for a hamburger. So, via our reasoning in pt.1, it follows that John cannot maintain a consistent nonvegan moral position on the question “Should cows have the right not to be stabbed for a hamburger?”.
Describing the Set
John has it that the set {a, b, c…}i is comprised of both intrinsic truths (ITs) and extrinsic truths (ETs)—thereby, referring to the manner in which an element of the set confers value-assignment relevance to the cow. The set is listed as follows:
Describing the Set
John has it that the set {a, b, c…}i is comprised of both intrinsic truths (ITs) and extrinsic truths (ETs)—thereby, referring to the manner in which an element of the set confers value-assignment relevance to the cow. The set is listed as follows:
Conclusion
Of course, above is not an exhaustive set of things John (most individuals) might forward in response to Q5 (/Q7), but it is intended to represent those things he would forward given all the available information and tools of reasoning—e.g., after he has considered all the problems associated with the set presented in pt.2.
To clarify, then, John does not hold that the mentally-deficient families lack sufficient moral value for the right not to be stabbed for hamburgers. And so, John’s stated-position is necessarily vegan on the question “Should cows have the right not to be stabbed for a hamburger?”. Reiterating the underlying logic: If the human is reducible to the cow in all relevant respects while retaining some arbitrary standard-of-treatment, then the cow should share that standard-of treatment.
Of course, above is not an exhaustive set of things John (most individuals) might forward in response to Q5 (/Q7), but it is intended to represent those things he would forward given all the available information and tools of reasoning—e.g., after he has considered all the problems associated with the set presented in pt.2.
To clarify, then, John does not hold that the mentally-deficient families lack sufficient moral value for the right not to be stabbed for hamburgers. And so, John’s stated-position is necessarily vegan on the question “Should cows have the right not to be stabbed for a hamburger?”. Reiterating the underlying logic: If the human is reducible to the cow in all relevant respects while retaining some arbitrary standard-of-treatment, then the cow should share that standard-of treatment.